OpenClaw Security Audit Command Prompts Plain-English Vulnerability Reports
A Reddit post on r/openclaw shares a specific prompt for the OpenClaw command-line interface designed to generate actionable security reports. The prompt instructs the tool to perform a deep security audit and present the results in a structured, plain-English format.
Key Details from the Source
The source material provides the exact command and output format requested. The user instructs running:
openclaw security audit --deepThe prompt specifies that the output should be a summary of every finding, excluding informational-only items. For each security issue identified, the report must include three concrete pieces of information:
- What's exposed: A clear description of the specific vulnerability or misconfiguration.
- Severity rating: A numerical score on a scale of 1 to 5 indicating how bad the finding is.
- Exact fix: The precise configuration change required to remediate the issue.
This type of prompt is useful for developers using AI coding agents who need to quickly understand and act on security scan results without parsing raw technical logs. The --deep flag suggests the audit performs an extensive check beyond surface-level analysis. Security auditing is a standard practice for identifying vulnerabilities like exposed API keys, insecure permissions, or outdated dependencies before they can be exploited.
📖 Read the full source: r/openclaw
👀 See Also
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